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Abstract 
We analyze the distributional and efficiency impacts of different allowance allocation schemes for a 
national cap and trade system using the USREP model, a new recursive dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy.  The USREP model tracks nine different income groups and twelve 
different geographic regions within the United States. Recently proposed legislation include the Waxman-
Markey House bill, the similar Kerry-Boxer bill in the Senate that has been replaced by a Kerry-Lieberman 
draft bill, and the Cantwell-Collins Senate bill that takes a different approach to revenue allocation. We 
consider allocation schemes motivated by these recent proposals applied to a comprehensive national cap 
and trade system that limits cumulative greenhouse gas emissions over the control period to 203 billion 
metric tons. The policy target approximates national goals identified in pending legislation. We find that 
the allocation schemes in all proposals are progressive over the lower half of the income distribution and 
proportional in the upper half of the income distribution. Scenarios based on the Cantwell-Collins 
allocation proposal are less progressive in early years and have lower welfare costs due to smaller 
redistribution to low income households and consequently lower income-induced increases in energy 
demand and less savings and investment. Scenarios based on the three other allocation schemes tend to 
overcompensate some adversely affected income groups and regions in early years but this dissipates over 
time as the allowance allocation effect becomes weaker. Finally we find that carbon pricing by itself 
(ignoring the return of carbon revenues through allowance allocations) is proportional to modestly 
progressive.  This striking result follows from the dominance of the sources over uses side impacts of the 
policy and stands in sharp contrast to previous work that has focused only on the uses side. The main 
reason is that lower income households derive a large fraction of income from government transfers and, 
reflecting the reality that these are generally indexed to inflation, we hold the transfers constant in real 
terms.  As a result this source of income is unaffected by carbon pricing, while wage and capital income is 
affected.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. Senate proposals for cap and trade legislation and the House-passed Waxman 
Markey Bill focus on similar overall cuts in greenhouse gases.  The biggest difference 
among them is how allowances, and the revenue from their auction, would be 
distributed.  Different uses of revenue or different allowance allocations would not in 
the first instance affect the direct cost of achieving emissions reductions but they can 
have important implications for how costs are borne by different regions and among 
households of different income levels.  Different uses of revenue may have indirect 
effects on the overall welfare cost of a policy to the extent revenue is used to offset 
other distortionary taxes. In addition the allowance allocation has efficiency impacts to 
the extent that it creates further distortions or prevents pass through of the full CO2 
price in some products, or is used in some way that does not create value for U.S. 
citizens.  Rausch et al. (2009) investigated some generic allocation schemes with a 
multi-region, multi-household static general equilibrium model of the U.S., the U.S. 
Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model. Here we extend the USREP model to a 
recursive dynamic formulation and design allocation schemes intended to approximate 
more closely specific cap and trade proposals. 
In extending the USREP model to a recursive dynamic formulation we borrow the 
dynamic structure of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model 
(Paltsev et al., 2005).  With this extension we are able more closely to represent features 
of revenue use and allowance allocation in specific legislative proposals and contrast 
their distributional implications. As with previous analyses of greenhouse gas 
legislation conducted with the EPPA model such as that in Paltsev et al. (2009) we 
attempt to capture key features of the cap and trade provisions in the proposals but are 
not able to address many other provisions of the bills that deal with energy efficiency 
standards and the like. The added value here is that we can consider distributional 
effects of proposed legislation. We contrast the allowance allocation schemes of the 
House legislation (Waxman-Markey) with those of the Senate proposals of Kerry and 
Boxer and of Cantwell and Collins. As a result of negotiations in the Senate the Kerry-
Boxer bill has stalled and been replaced by a discussion draft by Senators Kerry and 
Lieberman. The bill contains a variety of new features but is similar to Waxman-
Markey in its allocation of allowance value. To isolate the effects of different allocation 
schemes, we formulate a cap and trade policy designed to limit cumulative emissions 
over the control period in all scenarios to 203 billion metric tons (bmt). The cap and 
trade provisions of the proposals we consider would lead to somewhat different 
cumulative emissions because of differences in the timing of reductions, sectoral 
coverage, and whether outside credits were allowed.  
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer are part auction, part free allocation with a 
complex allowance and revenue allocation designed to achieve many different 
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purposes. In contrast, Cantwell and Collins proposal auctions all allowances and 
distributes most of the revenue with a very straightforward lump sum allocation to 
individuals.  Extending our analysis to distributional issues requires further 
interpretation, especially for those proposals with complex allocation schemes, of how 
allocation of allowances and auction revenue would actually occur if current proposals 
were implemented. 
Our analysis shows a number of results.  First, scenarios based on the Waxman-
Markey and Kerry-Boxer (or Kerry-Lieberman) allowance allocation schemes are more 
progressive (i.e., a larger welfare loss is imposed on higher income households) in early 
years than scenarios based on the Cantwell-Collins proposal.  We emphasize, however, 
that the overall distributional impact of these proposals depend on all the proposals 
contained in these legislative proposals and not just the cap and trade programs.  
Nonetheless the allowance allocation schemes are important determinants of the overall 
distributional impact of these bills.  Second, scenarios based on the Cantwell-Collins 
allocation proposal have lower welfare costs due to lower redistribution to low income 
households and consequent lower income-induced increases in energy demand.  Third, 
we find that the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer (or Kerry-Lieberman) allocation 
schemes appear to overcompensate some adversely affected income groups and regions 
early on though this dissipates over time as the allocation scheme evolves to something 
closer to lump sum distribution.  Fourth, the allocation schemes in all proposals are 
progressive over the lower half of the income distribution and essentially proportional 
in the upper half of the income distribution.  Finally, we find that carbon pricing by 
itself, ignoring the return of carbon revenues through allowance allocations, is 
proportional to modestly progressive.  We trace our result to the dominance of the 
sources side over the uses side impacts of the policy. It stands in sharp contrast to 
previous work that has focused only on the uses side, and has hence found energy 
taxation to be regressive. It is worth pointing out that our model framework provides 
only an analysis of welfare costs of climate policy and does not attempt to incorporate 
any benefits from averting climate change. Any welfare changes reported in this paper 
therefore refer to changes in costs. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 briefly describes the recursive dynamic 
version of the USREP model. Section 3 provides some background on incidence theory.  
Section 4 discusses the legislative proposals we evaluate, mapping the allowance and 
revenue allocation in the Bills to specific distributional schemes in the model. Section 5 
defines policy scenarios based on the proposed greenhouse gas control measures. 
Section 6 investigates the distributional implications across regions and income classes 
of allocation scenarios reflecting our interpretation of proposed policies, and Section 7 
reports the results of a counterfactual  analysis that allows us to trace the source of 
distribution effects we observe. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. A RECURSIVE-DYNAMIC U.S. REGIONAL ENERGY POLICY MODEL 
USREP is a computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy designed to 
analyze energy and greenhouse gas policies.
1
 It has the capability to assess impacts on 
regions, sectors and industries, and different household income classes. As in any 
classical Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model, our framework combines the 
behavioral assumption of rational economic agents with the analysis of equilibrium 
conditions, and represents price-dependent market interactions as well as the origination 
and spending of income based on microeconomic theory.  Profit-maximizing firms 
produce goods and services using intermediate inputs from other sectors and primary 
factors of production from households.  Utility-maximizing households receive income 
from government transfers and from the supply of factors of production to firms (labor, 
capital, land, and resources). Income thus earned is spent on goods and services or is 
saved. The government collects tax revenue which is spent on consumption and 
household transfers. USREP is a recursive-dynamic model, and hence savings and 
investment decisions are based on current period variables.
2
 
The USREP model is built on state-level economic data from the IMPLAN dataset 
(Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2008)  covering all transactions among businesses, 
households, and government agents for the base year 2006.  The detailed representation 
of existing taxes captures effects of tax-base erosion, and comprises sector- and region-
specific ad valorem output taxes, payroll taxes and capital income taxes. IMPLAN data 
has been augmented by incorporating regional tax data from the NBER tax simulator to 
represent marginal personal income tax rates by region and income class. Energy data 
from the Energy Information Administration’s State Energy Data System (SEDS) are 
merged with the economic data to provide physical flows of energy for greenhouse gas 
accounting. Non-CO2 greenhouse gases are based on the EPA inventory data, and are 
included as in the EPPA model with endogenous costing of the abatement (Hyman et 
al., 2003).  
The basic structure and data used in the USREP model are described in some detail 
in Rausch et al. (2009) with the dynamic structure borrowed from EPPA (Paltsev et al., 
2005). We focus discussion here on elements of the model that differ from that 
described in these two previous papers and on the data sources and calibration needed to  
 
                                                 
1
 As in any standard computable general equilibrium model, our framework adopts a full-employment 
assumption and further assumes that money is neutral, i.e. production and consumption decisions are 
solely determined by relative prices. 
2
 Experience from a forward-looking version of the EPPA model (Babiker et al., 2008) suggests that 
energy sector and CO2 price behavior are similar to those derived from a recursive-dynamic model. 
Consumption shifting as an additional avenue of adjustment to the policy may, however, lower overall 
policy costs. On the other hand, inter-temporal optimization with perfect foresight poorly represents 
the real economy where agents face high levels of uncertainty that likely lead to higher costs than if 
they knew the future with certainty. We leave for future work the careful comparison of how 
alternative approaches to expectations formation may influence model results. 
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Table 1.  USREP Model Details: Regional and Sectoral Breakdown and Primary Input Factors. 
Region
a
  Sectors  Primary Input Factors  
Alaska (AK) Non-Energy  Capital  
California (CA)    Agriculture (AGR)  Labor 
Florida (FL)    Services (SRV)  Land  
New York (NY)    Energy-Intensive (EIS)          Crude Oil  
New England (NENGL)    Other Industries (OTH)  Shale Oil  
South East (SEAST)    Transportation (TRN)  Natural Gas  
North East (NEAST)  Energy  Coal  
South Central (SCENT)    Coal (COL)  Nuclear  
Texas (TX)    Convent. Crude Oil (CRU)                                   Hydro
North Central (NCENT)    Refined Oil (OIL)  Wind  
Mountain (MOUNT)   Natural Gas (GAS)  
Pacific  (PACIF)    Electric: Fossil  (ELE)   
   Electric: Nuclear (NUC)  
   Electric: Hydro (HYD)  
   Advanced Technologies      
 (see Table 3) 
 
a
Model regions are aggregations of the following U.S. states: NENGL = Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island; SEAST = Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi; NEAST = West Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, Wisconsin, 
Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, District of Columbia; SCENT = Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Louisiana; NCENT = Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Iowa; MOUNT = Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico; PACIF = 
Oregon, Washington, Hawaii. 
 
regionalize the model. The underlying state level data base provides flexibility in the 
regional detail of the model.  Here we use the regional structure shown in Figure 1.  
This structure separately identifies larger states, allows representation of separate 
electricity interconnects, and captures some of the diversity among states in use and 
production of energy. Table 1 provides an overview of the sectoral breakdown and the 
primary factors of production. Consistent with the assumption of perfect competition on 
product and factor markets, production and consumption processes exhibit constant-
returns-to-scale and are modeled by nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
functions. A detailed description of the nesting structure for each production sector and 
household consumption is provided in Rausch et al. (2009). 
There are nine representative households in each region differentiated by income 
levels as shown in Table 2.  Households across income classes and regions differ in 
terms of income sources as well as expenditures. State-specific projections through  
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Figure 1. Regional Aggregation in the USREP Model. 
2030 are from the U.S. Census Bureau (2009a).
3
 Labor supply is determined by the 
household choice between leisure and labor. We calibrate compensated and 
uncompensated labor supply elasticities following the approach described in Ballard 
(2000), and assume for all income groups that the uncompensated (compensated) labor 
supply elasticity is 0.1 (0.3). Labor is fully mobile across industries in a given region 
but is immobile across U.S. regions. 
Savings enters directly into the utility function which generates the demand for 
savings and makes the consumption-investment decision endogenous. We follow an 
approach by Bovenberg, Goulder and Gurney (2005) distinguishing between capital that 
is used in production of market goods and services and capital used in households (e.g. 
the housing stock).  We assume income from the former is subject to taxation while the 
imputed income from housing capital is not, and so households can shift investment 
between market and housing capital in response to changing capital taxation. Lacking 
specific data on capital ownership, households are assumed to own a pool of U.S. 
capital—that is they do not disproportionately own capital assets within the region in 
which they reside. 
We adopt the vintage capital structure of the EPPA model.  Malleable capital is 
mobile across U.S. regions and industries, while vintaged capital is region and industry 
specific. As a result there is a common rate of return on malleable capital across the  
 
 
                                                 
3
 The USREP model incorporates demographic data on the population and number of households in each 
region and income class for the base year 2006 based on U.S. Census Data (2009b). We apply state-
specific population growth rates uniformly to all income groups.  
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Table 2.  Income Classes Used in the USREP Model and Cumulative Population. 
Income class Description  Cumulative Population  
for whole U.S. (in %)
a 
hhl Less than $10,000 7.3 
hh10 $10,000 to $15,000 11.7 
hh15 $15,000 to $25,000 21.2 
hh25 $25,000 to $30,000 31.0 
hh30 $30,000 to $50,000 45.3 
hh50 $50,000 to $75,000 65.2 
hh75 $75,000 to $100,000 78.7 
hh100 $100,000 to $150,000 91.5 
hh150 $150,000 plus 100.0 
a
Based on data from U.S. Census Bureau (2009a). 
 
U.S. The accumulation of both malleable and non-malleable capital is calculated as 
investment net of depreciation according to the standard perpetual inventory 
assumption. Given base year data about investment demand by sector and by region, we 
specify for each region an investment sector that produces an aggregate investment 
good equal to the sum of endogenous savings by different household types. Foreign 
capital flows are fixed as in the EPPA model. We assume an integrated U.S. market for 
fossil fuel resources and that the regional ownership of resources is distributed in 
proportion to capital income.  Rausch et al. (2009) explored the implications of 
assuming instead that resource ownership was regional.  Such an assumption amplifies 
regional differences in the impacts of climate legislation, resulting in greater costs for 
regions with significant energy production but we believe that assumption overestimates 
regional differences because equity ownership in large energy companies is broadly 
owned. 
Labor-augmenting technical change is a key driver of economic growth as in EPPA. 
Regional labor productivity growth rates were calibrated to match AEO2009 GDP 
growth through 2030. Beyond 2030, population and labor productivity growth rates are 
extrapolated by fitting a logistic function that assumes convergence in growth rates in 
2100. The 2100 targets for annual labor productivity growth and for annual population 
growth are two and zero percent, respectively. 
Energy supply is regionalized for USREP by incorporating data on regional fossil 
fuel reserves from the U.S. Geological Service and the Department of Energy
4
. The 
resource depletion model and elasticities of substitution between resource and non-
resource inputs in fossil fuel production are identical to those in EPPA. As in EPPA, a 
                                                 
4
 Source for crude oil and natural gas reserves: Department of Energy (2009). Source for shale oil 
reserves: John R. Dyni (2006). Source for coal resources: USGS (2009). 
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range of advanced technologies not widely present in the base year data are specified in 
Table 3.  
The markups, share parameters and elasticity parameters for the advanced energy 
supply technologies are those from Paltsev et al. (2009) and the same cost mark-ups 
apply in all regions except for renewables. For renewable the cost shares are taken from 
 
Table 3.  Summary of Advanced Technologies in USREP. 
Technology Description 
Coal Gasification  Converts coal into a perfect substitute for natural gas. 
Shale Oil Extracts and upgrades shale oil resources  into a 
perfect substitute for oil. 
Biomass Liquids Converts biomass into a perfect substitute for refined 
oil. 
Biomass Electricity Converts biomass into a perfect substitute for electricity. 
Intermittent Wind and Solar Converts intermittent wind and solar resources into an 
imperfect substitute for electricity. Costs increase as 
wind production increases as a share of total electricity 
production, representing increasing costs of integrating 
wind into the grid. 
Wind with gas backup Creates a perfect substitute for conventional electricity 
by jointly building wind turbines and natural gas 
generation. The gas generation is assumed to operate 
at a 7% capacity factor—only as a backup when wind is 
not sufficient to meet load requirements. 
Wind with biomass backup Creates a perfect substitute for conventional electricity 
by jointly building wind and biomass generation.  The 
biomass generation operates at a 7% capacity factor—
only as a backup when wind is not sufficient to meet 
load requirements. 
Advanced Gas Based on natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) 
electricity generation technology that converts natural 
gas into electricity. 
Advanced Gas with Carbon 
Capture and Sequestration 
Natural gas combined cycle technology that captures 
90% or more of the CO2 produced in generating 
electricity. 
Advanced Coal with Carbon 
Capture and Sequestration 
Broadly based on an Integrated coal gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC) plant that captures 90% or 
more of the CO2 produced in generating electricity, but 
can also represent flue gas capture processes. 
Advanced nuclear Next generation of nuclear power plants incorporating 
estimated costs of building new nuclear power plants in 
the future. 
 
Paltsev et al. (2009) but regional mark-ups and elasticity parameters are derived from 
regional supply curves. Regional wind supply curves for each technology have been 
estimated based on high-resolution wind data from NREL (2009) and a levelized cost 
model described in Morris (2009) that was also the basis for cost estimates in Paltsev et 
al. (2009).  The TrueWinds model (NREL, 2009) provides data on the capacity factors 
for wind turbines if they were located at sites across the U.S., allowing construction of a 
regional wind supply curve that depends on the quality of wind resources in each 
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region.  We derive regional supply curves for biomass from data from Oakridge 
National Laboratories (2009) that describes quantity and price pairs for biomass supply 
for each state. 
Non-price induced improvements in energy efficiency are represented by an 
Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement (AEEI) parameter as in EPPA, and 
represent technological progress that reduces at no cost the energy needed in 
consumption and production activities, thus resulting in reduced energy use per unit of 
activity and general productivity improvement over time.  Reference case energy use is 
calibrated to the updated AEO2009 reference case (Energy Information Administration 
(2009)). The baseline thus includes both the impacts of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA). 
Sectoral output produced in each region is converted through a constant-elasticity-of-
transformation function into goods destined for the regional, national, and international 
market. All goods are tradable. Depending on the type of commodity, we distinguish 
three different representations of intra-national regional trade. First, bilateral flows for 
all non-energy goods are represented as ―Armington‖ goods (Armington (1969)), where 
like goods from other regions are imperfectly substitutable for domestically produced 
goods. Second, domestically traded energy goods, except for electricity, are assumed to 
be homogeneous products, i.e. there is a national pool that demands domestic exports 
and supplies domestic imports. This assumption reflects the high degree of integration 
of intra-U.S. markets for natural gas, crude and refined oil, and coal.  Third, we 
differentiate six regional electricity pools that are designed to provide an approximation 
of the existing structure of independent system operators (ISO) and the three major 
NERC interconnections in the U.S. More specifically, we distinguish the Western, 
Texas ERCOT and the Eastern NERC interconnections and in addition identify AK, 
NENGL, and NY as separate regional pools.
5,6
 Within each regional pool, we assume 
that traded electricity is a homogenous good, where no electricity is traded between 
regional pools.  
Analogously to the export side, we adopt the Armington (1969) assumption of 
product heterogeneity for imports. A CES function characterizes the trade-off between 
imported, from national and international sources, and locally produced varieties of the 
                                                 
5
 We identify NY and NENGL as separate pools since electricity flows with contiguous ISOs represent 
only a small fraction of total electricity generation in those regions. For example, based on own 
calculation from data provided by ISOs, net electricity trade between ISO New England and ISO New 
York account for less than 1% of total electricity produced in ISO New England. Interface flows 
between the New York and neighboring ISOs amount to about 6% of total electricity generation in 
ISO New York. 
6
 The regional electricity pools are thus defined as follows: NENGL, NY, TX, AK each represent a 
separate pool. The Western NERC interconnection comprises CA, MOUNT, and PACIF. The Eastern 
NERC interconnection comprises NEAST, SEAST, and FL.  
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same goods. Foreign closure of the model is determined through a national balance-of-
payments (BOP) constraint. 
3. BACKGROUND ON DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Carbon pricing through a cap-and-trade system has very similar impacts to broad 
based energy taxes – not surprising since over eighty percent of greenhouse gas 
emissions are associated with the combustion of fossil fuels (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (2009)).  The literature on distributional implications across income 
groups of energy taxes is a long and extensive one and some general conclusions have 
been reached that help inform the distributional analysis of carbon pricing.  First, 
analyses that rank households by their annual income find that excise taxes in general 
tend to be regressive (e.g. Pechman (1985) looking at excise taxes in general and 
Metcalf (1999) looking specifically at a cluster of environmental taxes).   
The difficulty with this ranking procedure is that many households in the lowest 
income groups are not poor in any traditional sense that should raise welfare concerns.  
This group includes households that are facing transitory negative income shocks or 
who are making human capital investments that will lead to higher incomes later in life 
(e.g. graduate students).  It also includes many retired households which may have little 
current income but are able to draw on extensive savings.   
That current income may not be a good measure of household well being has long 
been known and has led to a number of efforts to measure lifetime income.  This leads 
to the second major finding in the literature.  Consumption taxes – including taxes on 
energy – look considerably less regressive when lifetime income measures are used than 
when annual income measures are used.  Studies include Davies, St. Hilaire and 
Whalley (1984), Poterba (1989, 1991), Bull, Hassett and Metcalf (1994), Lyon and 
Schwab (1995) and many others.
7
   
The lifetime income approach is an important caveat to distributional findings from 
annual incidence analyses but it relies on strong assumptions about household 
consumption decisions.  In particular it assumes that households base current 
consumption decisions knowing their full stream of earnings over their lifetime.  While 
it is reasonable to assume that households have some sense of future income, it may be 
implausible to assume they have complete knowledge or that they necessarily base 
spending decisions on income that may be received far in the future.
8
  It may be that the 
truth lies somewhere between annual and lifetime income analyses. Moreover, if one 
                                                 
7
 Most of these studies look at a snapshot of taxes in one year relative to some proxy for lifetime income 
– often current consumption based on the permanent income hypothesis of Friedman (1957). An 
exception is Fullerton and Rogers (1993) who model the lifetime pattern of tax payments as well as 
income. 
8
 On the other hand casual observation of graduate students in professional schools (business, law, 
medicine) make clear that many households are taking future income into account in their current 
consumption decisions. 
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were to use a lifetime income approach, one would like to track consumption over the 
lifecycle to capture any lifecycle changes in the consumption of carbon intensive 
products and compare lifetime carbon pricing burdens rather than a single-year 
snapshot. This paper takes a current income approach to sorting households.   
Turning to climate policy in particular a number of papers have attempted to measure 
the distributional impacts of carbon pricing across household income groups. Dinan and 
Rogers (2002) build on Metcalf (1999) to consider how the distribution of allowances 
from a cap and trade program affects the distributional outcome.  Both these papers 
emphasize that focusing on the distributional burden of carbon pricing (either a tax or 
auctioned permits) without regard to the use of the revenue raised (or potentially raised) 
from carbon pricing provides an incomplete distributional analysis.  How the proceeds 
from carbon pricing are distributed have important impacts on the ultimate 
distributional outcome.   
The point that use of carbon revenues matters for distribution is the basis for the 
distributional and revenue neutral proposal in Metcalf (2007) for a carbon tax swap. It is 
also the focus of the analysis in Burtraw, Sweeney and Walls (2009).  This latter paper 
considers five different uses of revenue from a cap and trade auction focusing on 
income distribution as well as regional distribution.  A similar focus on income and 
regional distribution is in Hassett, Mathur and Metcalf (2009).  This last paper does not 
consider the use of revenue but does compare both annual and lifetime income 
measures as well as a regional analysis using annual income.  Grainger and Kolstad 
(2009) do a similar analysis as that of Hassett, Mathur and Metcalf (2009) and note that 
the use of household equivalence scales can exacerbate the regressivity of carbon 
pricing.  Finally Burtraw, Walls and Blonz (2009) consider the distributional impacts in 
an expenditure side analysis where they focus on the allocation of permits to local 
distribution companies (LDCs).  Rausch et al. (2009) also investigate the welfare costs 
of allocations to LDCs and find that allocations that lead to real or perceived reductions 
in electricity prices by consumers have large efficiency costs.    
With the exception of the last paper, all of the papers above assume that the burden 
of carbon pricing is shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher energy prices 
and higher prices of energy-intensive consumption goods and services. That carbon 
pricing is passed forward to consumers follows from the analysis of a number of 
computable general equilibrium models.  Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), for example, 
find that coal prices rise by over 90 percent of a $25 per ton carbon tax in the short and 
long run (Table 2.4).
9
  This incidence result underlies their finding that only a small 
percentage of permits need be freely allocated to energy intensive industries to 
                                                 
9
 They assume world pricing for oil and natural gas so that the gross of tax prices for these two fossil 
fuels rise by the full amount of the tax. 
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compensate shareholders for any windfall losses from a cap and trade program.  See 
also Bovenberg, Goulder and Gurney (2005) for more on this issue. 
Metcalf et al. (2008) consider the degree of forward shifting, as a result of higher 
consumer prices and backward shifting, as a result of lower factor returns, over different 
time periods for a carbon tax policy begun in 2012 and slowly ramped up through 2050.  
The tax on carbon emissions from coal are largely passed forward to consumers in all 
years of the policy in roughly the same magnitude found by Bovenberg and Goulder 
(2001).  Roughly ten percent of the burden of carbon pricing on crude oil is shifted back 
to oil producers initially with the share rising to roughly one-fourth by 2050 as 
consumers are able to find substitutes for oil in the longer run.  Interestingly the 
consumer burden of the carbon tax on natural gas exceeds the tax. This reflects the 
sharp rise in demand for natural gas as an initial response to carbon pricing is to 
substitute gas for coal in electricity generation.  By 2050 the producer price is falling for 
reasonably stringent carbon policies.
10
 
Fullerton and Heutel (2007) construct an analytic general equilibrium model to 
identify the various key parameters and relationships that determine the ultimate burden 
of a tax on a pollutant.
11
   While the model is not sufficiently detailed to provide a 
realistic assessment of climate change impacts on the U.S. economy it illustrates critical 
parameters and relationships that drive burden results. 
The general equilibrium models discussed above all assume a representative agent in 
the U.S. thereby limiting their usefulness to considering distributional questions.  
Metcalf et al. (2008) apply results from a representative agent model to data on U.S. 
households that allows them to draw conclusions about distributional impacts of 
policies but the household heterogeneity is not built into the model.
12
   
Several computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have been constructed to 
investigate regional implications of climate and energy in the U.S. For example, the 
ADAGE model, documented in Ross (2008), has a U.S. regional module which is 
usually aggregated to five or six regions.  The MRN-NEEM model described in 
Tuladhar et al. (2009) has nine U.S. regions.  Both these models use a single 
representative household in each region.  
                                                 
10
 Distributional results depend importantly on the stringency of policy.  How stringent the policy is 
affects whether carbon free technologies are adopted in the EPPA model and therefore what the 
relative demand for fossil fuels is.  In the text above we are reporting carbon tax results for a policy 
that limits emissions to 287 billion metric tons over the control period. 
11
 The paper also provides a thorough summary of the literature on the incidence impacts of 
environmental taxes. 
12
 A recent paper by Bento et al. (2009) marks an advance in the literature by allowing for household 
heterogeneity over income and location.  That paper considers the impact of increased U.S. gasoline 
taxes taking into account new and used car purchases along with scrappage and changes in driving 
behavior. 
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Rausch et al. (2009) does an explicit CGE analysis of carbon pricing in a single-
period CGE model.  That analysis considers a variety of possible allocations of the 
revenue and/or allowances from cap-and-trade system and finds that the use of revenues 
affects the overall progressivity of the policy substantially.  It also finds that a 
significant portion of the carbon price is passed back to factors of production – most 
notably owners of natural resources and capital.  This contributes to a greater 
progressivity of carbon pricing than found in literature that assumes full forward 
shifting.  
4. U.S. CAP AND TRADE PROPOSALS: ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION 
Below we carry out distributional analyses of cap and trade policies based on 
alternative proposals for greenhouse gas control legislation currently under 
consideration in the U.S.  These are the house-passed American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (H.R. 2454) sponsored by Reps. Waxman and Markey, the Clean Energy 
Jobs and American Power Act (S. 1733) a Senate bill similar to H.R. 2454 and 
sponsored by Senators Kerry and Boxer, and now replaced by the American Power Act 
(APA) draft bill by Kerry and Lieberman, and the Carbon Limits for America’s 
Renewal (CLEAR) Act, a competing Senate Bill sponsored by Senators Cantwell and 
Collins.   
All proposals seek an overall reduction of GHG emissions in the U.S. to 83% below 
2005 levels by 2050 with intervening targets.  Cap and trade components of the bills 
cover most of the economy’s emissions but not necessarily all of them, with other 
measures directed toward uncapped sectors.  For example, estimates are that Waxman-
Markey covers between 85% and 90% of emissions with a cap and trade system.  
Waxman-Markey has a slightly looser target for sectors covered by the cap and trade in 
2020 than does Kerry-Boxer, issuing allowances at a level 17% below 2005 emissions 
in 2020, whereas the economy-wide goal is a 20% reduction by that date.  Kerry-
Lieberman would sell as many allowances as needed to refineries at a fixed price but 
would adjust over time to meet quantity targets. In our simulations of the effects of 
these bills, we assume the national goals are met, and we achieve them with a cap and 
trade system that covers all U.S. emissions except for land use CO2 sources (or sinks).  
All of these proposals including banking and limited borrowing provisions and hence 
the time profile of reductions described in the bills are better thought of as the time 
profile of allowance allocation, with actual emissions levels in each year determined by 
how allowances are banked or borrowed (to the extent borrowing is allowed).  In our 
simulations we find that the allocations result in net banking with no borrowing.  Of 
course, in actuality borrowing may occur to the extent that unexpected costs make it 
attractive to bring permits forward in time.   
While the stated national targets are identical across the bills, the Cantwell and 
Collins proposal has no provision for the use of offsets from outside the capped sectors 
14 
 
to be used in lieu of the cap. Reductions similar in nature to the offsets allowed in the 
other bills are to be funded from a portion of the auction revenues that are subject to 
future appropriations. The other two proposals allow up to two billion tons per year of 
outside credits from a combination of domestic and foreign sources.  In our simulations 
the domestic credits would need to come from a combination of reduced land use 
emissions and increased land use sinks.  Foreign credits would come from qualified 
reductions abroad.  As shown in Paltsev et al. (2009) if these credits are available at 
reasonable costs they would significantly reduce the CO2 price and expected welfare 
cost of the legislation.  Emissions from the capped sectors then are reduced much less 
than the target levels in the bill because available allowances are supplemented with 
external credits.  Our main interest in this paper is the consequences of alternative 
distribution of allowances, and so we simulate the Cantwell-Collins allocation scheme 
allowing for the same level of outside credits as the other two bills.  Any differences are 
the result of the allowance distribution mechanisms rather than the level of the cap.  
The proposals are not always clear as to whether allowances are auctioned by some 
central Federal Agency and the revenue distributed or the allowances are distributed to 
entities who then can sell them.  For example, designations to States could involve 
either a portion of allowance revenue or direct allocation of allowances leaving it up to 
the State to sell them into the allowance market.  For our modeling purposes it does not 
matter whether it is revenue or the allowances that are distributed.  We thus focus in our 
analysis on the allocation of ―allowance value‖ in the different proposals to allow for 
distribution of allowances or the revenue from an auction.  
Figure 2 shows the allowance allocation scheme as it is proposed in the Waxman-
Markey bill. We do not show graphically the Kerry-Lieberman, Kerry-Boxer and 
Cantwell-Collins allowance allocation schemes here. The Cantwell-Collins bill calls for 
75% of allowance revenue to be returned in a lump sum manner and 25% retained to 
meet several objectives but without specifying percentages for each. In terms of Figure 
2, that bill would be simply two bars dividing allowance value among these two 
purposes. The allocation schemes in Kerry-Boxer and Kerry-Lieberman are similar to 
Waxman-Markey. The main difference is in terms of allowances set aside to offset the 
impact of the bill on the deficit.  Waxman-Markey allocates at most 10% of the 
allowances for this purpose, in part directly and in part by directing how revenues 
obtained through early auction would be used, whereas Kerry-Boxer allocates a 
percentage that grows to 25%.
13
 The allocation of revenue for deficit impacts in Kerry-
Lieberman is much closer to Waxman-Markey. The increasing share devoted to this 
purpose proportional reduces the allocation to all other purposes.  For example, Kerry-
Boxer is able to allocate less than 50% of allowance value directly to households 
                                                 
13
 This depends in part on whether future vintage allowances are sold early in the 2014-2020 period.  If 
so, the share of allowances allocated to deficit reduction rises to roughly 12 percent of total 
allowances (current allowances and future allowances brought forward). 
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through either the low income energy assistance or the consumer rebate fund—whereas 
Waxman-Markey is able to allocate about 65% to households by 2050 through these 
two programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Allocation of Allowance Value in the Waxman-Markey Bill. 
 
Both Kerry-Boxer and Waxman-Markey have a small strategic reserve of allowances 
and both allocate a substantial portion of allowances to local electricity and natural gas 
distribution companies in early years on the basis that these regulated entities will turn 
allowance value over to ratepayers, thus offsetting some of the impact of higher energy 
prices.  This turns these LDCs into the mechanism for distribution as opposed to a 
government auction agency as in Cantwell-Collins.  The other bills transition to a 
system closer to Cantwell-Collins over time, replacing the LDC distribution with a 
consumer rebate fund.  Both retain a separate allocation to focus specifically on low 
income energy consumers.   Both also then distribute allowances to different industries 
that are expected to be particularly affected by the legislation, but these allocations 
phase out by 2030.  Use of allowances as an extra incentive for carbon capture and 
sequestration is also identified in both.  A next set of allowances are allocated to fund 
various domestic energy efficiency programs.  The next grouping of allocations is for 
international mitigation and adaptation and for domestic adaptation programs.  
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Waxman-Markey contains a large set of allowances in later years designated for prior 
year use.  This use possibly reallocates allowances through time, allowing the 
possibility of Federal borrowing if allowance prices rise too much.  Of more relevance 
here is that the bill prescribes about one-half of this allowance value to go to the 
Treasury to offset impacts on the deficit and the other half as a consumer rebate.  These 
amounts are shown in Figure 2 combined with the other provisions that direct revenue 
to the Treasury and to the consumer rebate.  That value is allocated in the year in which 
the allowances would be originally issued, i.e. assuming the Federal government does 
not borrow them or if it does, the income is not rebated immediately.  The Kerry-Boxer 
bill does not have this provision. 
We do not represent the many different programs to which these allowances or 
allowance value would go and the exact recipients will depend on program decisions 
yet to be made.  However, we approximate the impact on regions and households of 
different income levels by distributing the allowance value based on data we have 
within the model, and that approximates what we believe to be the intent of the different 
distributions or how they would tend to work in practice. The distributional instruments 
we have at our disposal in the USREP Model and the correspondence to allocations 
called out in the bills are given in Table 4. For example, we allocate to households the 
proposed distribution of allowances to LDCs based on emissions and respective 
electricity and natural gas consumption. To determine the regional distribution, we 
allocate 50% of LDCs allowances based on historic sectoral emissions for the electricity 
and natural gas sector, respectively. The other half is allocated to regions based on 
household electricity and natural gas consumption.
14
 Within a region, allowances to 
LDCs are allocated based on respective fuel consumption. Allocations designated for 
low income households are distributed to households with incomes of less than $30,000 
per year.   
Distributions to industries other than LDCs go to households based on their capital 
earnings on the basis that this value will be reflected in the equity value of firms, and so 
households that own capital, for example, through stock ownership, will be the 
beneficiaries.
15
  Allowances distributed for energy efficiency and such are distributed 
by region based on regional energy consumption and then within a region by energy 
consumption by household on the basis that regions and households that consume more 
                                                 
14
 Rausch et al. (2009) consider the efficiency implications of a misperception by households that this 
lump-sum transfer lowers the marginal price of electricity and natural gas. 
15 An output-based rebate (OBR) to energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries may result in a 
greater pass-through of allowance value to end consumers relative to our allocation based on capital 
earnings. How this allowance should be divided up, however, depends on factors such as the degree of 
pass-through in downstream sectors, given that EITE products are often intermediate goods, e.g. steel.  
Our approach treats all vulnerable industries symmetrically, and we allocate allowances lump sum 
proportional to capital income. Our approach does not capture incentive effects that would arise if 
allowance value was used to subsidize output in these industries. Such output subsidies would incur 
additional efficiency costs that we do not capture. 
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energy have more opportunities to take advantage of these programs. Allowances 
designated for worker assistance are distributed to regions based on oil and coal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                
Figure 3.  The Allocation of Allowance Value according to Model Distribution Instruments:      
(a) Targeted Allowance Allocation Scheme, (b) Per Capita Dividend Scheme. 
 
production on the basis that these industries are most likely to be affected by 
unemployment as the country shifts away from fossil fuels.  We distribute funds 
devoted to CCS along with other energy R&D funds. 
Given this mapping of the allocation provisions in the various legislative proposals 
we construct Figure 3 that is similar to Figure 2 but showing instead the allocation of 
allowance value mapped to the instruments we use in USREP.  The distribution 
instruments for all of these uses, except Foreign and Government, direct revenue to 
households but the particular instrument determines how the allowance value is 
allocated among households in different regions and in different income classes.  As 
modeled, allowance value allocated abroad has no value for U.S. households.  In the 
proposed legislation, most of the allowance value distribution is a pure transfer but 
some of these program expenditures are intended to incentivize energy savings and the 
like. Our allocation approach treats all of these program expenditures as pure 
transfers.
16
  To the extent these programs overcome barriers that are not addressed by 
the CO2 price, additional efficiency gains would reduce the welfare costs we estimate.  
To the extent these programs create double-incentives for particular activities, then they 
                                                 
16
 We assume that the 25% of allowances in the Cantwell-Collins bill that go to a dedicated trust to fund 
climate mitigation and adaptation, clean energy and efficiency, and transition assistance programs, are 
allocated according to residual shares for similar categories (Energy use, Foreign, Government) in the 
Waxman-Markey bill. We understand that additional legislation would be needed to appropriate this 
allowance revenue to the purposes identified in the legislation, and absent that the revenue would be 
returned to the Treasury.  
(a) (b) 
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are redirecting abatement to activities that are not the most cost effective and that would 
increase the welfare cost we estimate.  The assumption that they are pure transfers is 
therefore a neutral assumption. Furthermore, note that transfers of allowance value to 
households are treated as being non-taxable, with the effect of increasing how much 
allowance value must be set aside relative to a scenario where such transfers are taxed.  
Allowances allocated to government reduce the need for capital and labor taxes to be 
raised as much to meet the revenue neutrality assumption we impose
17
, and so affect the 
distribution to households based on how increases in taxes affect different regions and 
income classes. 
5. SCENARIO DESIGN 
We distinguish two sets of scenarios that differ with respect to the underlying 
allowance allocation scheme. Scenarios labeled TAAS represent a Targeted Allowance 
Allocation Scheme that is based on the Waxman-Markey or Kerry-Lieberman proposal. 
The TAAS_DR scenario sets aside a larger amount of allowances for the purpose of 
Deficit Reduction (Deficit Reduction) as in the allocation rule proposed by Kerry-
Boxer. Scenarios labeled PCDS model a simple Per Capita Dividend Scheme as 
described in the Cantwell-Collins proposal.  
For each of the proposed allocation schemes, we design two scenarios that differ 
with respect to how the revenue neutrality requirement is met.
18
 Our base case 
assumption is that sufficient allowance revenue is withheld by the government to cover 
the deficit impact and the remaining revenue is allocated at the percentages shown in 
Figure 3. An alternative case, denoted TAX, assumes that only the amount of allowance 
revenue specifically designated for deficit reduction in the bills is allocated to the 
government.  We then raise capital and labor taxes uniformly across regions and income 
classes (in percentage points) to offset revenue losses from carbon pricing.  This is 
separate from any allowance revenue targeted to deficit reduction.  All scenarios 
assume the medium offset case from the analysis carried out in Appendix C of Paltsev 
et al. (2009) with identical assumptions about supply and costs of domestic and 
international offsets. We further assume that offsets have a cost to the economy, and 
implement this assumption by transferring abroad the value of allowances purchases 
internationally. Our assumption is that the average cost of these credits is $5 per 
effective ton of offsets of CO2-e in 2015, rising at 4% per year thereafter.
19
  Also  
                                                 
17
 See Section 5 for a discussion of our treatment of revenue neutrality. 
18
 We fix government spending in the policy scenarios to match government spending under the reference 
scenario.  Since government spending does not enter household utility functions, we did not want to 
confound welfare impacts from changes in the size of government with welfare impacts of climate 
policy.  We discuss the implications of this assumption in section 6.1 below. Government spending in 
the reference scenario is assumed to growth in proportion with aggregate income. 
19
 The Waxman-Markey bill specifies that 1.25 tons of foreign reductions are required to produce 1 ton of 
effective offsets. The $5/ton initial offset price means the actual payment per ton of foreign reduction 
is $4. For all proposals analyzed, we treat offsets costs symmetrically.  
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Table 4.  Correspondence between Proposals Allowance Value Allocations and Distribution Instruments in USREP. 
 
ALLOWANCE RECIPIENTS MODEL INSTRUMENT 
Mitigating Price Impacts on Consumers  
 All electricity local distribution companies (LDCs) Lump-sum transfer to consumers. Allocated to regions based on GHG emissions 
(50%) and based on value of electricity consumption (50%). Within a region, allocated 
to households based on the value of electricity. 
 Additional allowances for small electricity LDCs Lump-sum transfer to consumers. Allocated to regions based on GHG emissions 
(50%) and based on value of gas consumption (50%). Within a region, allocated to 
households based on the value of gas consumption. 
 Natural gas LDCs Lump-sum transfer to consumers based on value of gas consumption. 
 State programs for home heating oil, propane, and kerosene 
consumers 
Lump-sum transfer to consumers based on value of oil consumption (excluding oil 
consumed for transportation purposes). 
Assistance for Households and Workers  
 Protection for low-income households Lump-sum transfer to households with annual income less than $30k. 
 Worker assistance and job training Distributed to regions based on value of energy production (coal, crude oil and refined 
oil). Within a region, distributed across households base on wage income. 
 Per-capita consumer rebate Lump-sum transfer based on per-capita. 
 Nuclear working training
1
 Distributed to regions based on value of nuclear electricity generation. Within a region, 
distributed across households based on wage income. 
Allocations to Vulnerable Industries
2
 Lump-sum transfer based on capital income. 
Technology Funding
3
 Distributed to regions based on energy use (industrial and private). Within a region, 
distributed based on household energy consumption. 
International Funding
4
 Transferred abroad. 
Domestic Adaptation Distributed to government. 
Other Uses  
 Deposited into the Treasury (to offset the bill's impact on the 
deficit) 
Distributed to government. 
 Grants to state and local agencies for transportation planning and 
transit
1
 
Distributed to government. 
 Compensation for "early action" emission reductions prior to cap's 
inception 
Distributed to households on a per capita basis. 
 Allowances already auctioned in prior years 46% distributed to households on a per-capita basis, 54% distributed to government.
5
 
 Strategic reserve allowances Distributed to households on a per capita basis. 
Note: 
1
This allowance category only applies to the Kerry-Boxer bill. 
2
Allocations to vulnerable industries include: Energy-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries, 
all petroleum refiners, additional allowances for small refiners, merchant coal-fired electricity generators, generators under long-term contracts without cost 
recovery, cogeneration facilities in industrial parks. 
3
Technology Funding includes: Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) incentives, state renewable energy 
and efficiency programs, state building retrofit programs, incentives for renewable energy and agricultural emissions reductions, clean vehicle technology 
incentives, energy innovation hubs, energy efficiency and renewable energy worker training fund, advanced energy research, supplemental reductions from 
agriculture, abandoned mine land, and renewable energy. 
4
International Funding includes: International avoided deforestation, international clean technology 
deployment, and international adaptation. 
5
We allocate allowances that are already auctioned in prior years to the government and to households according to the 
respective average share over the period from 2012-2050. 
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note that since we create more allowance revenue for the government by increasing the 
allowances to account for credits coming from outside the system, we assume that the 
income transferred abroad to account for permit prices is taken from the allowance 
revenue. Finally, our assumptions about the supply of offsets imply a 203 bmt 
cumulative emissions target for 2012-2050, which underlies all of the scenarios we 
consider here.  
Our analysis also takes banking and borrowing into consideration. In the Waxman-
Markey bill, banking of allowances is unlimited and a two-year compliance period 
allows unlimited borrowing from one year ahead without penalty.  Limited borrowing 
from two to five years ahead is also allowed, but with interest. In general, we find no 
need for aggregate borrowing, and so there is no need to implement an explicit 
restriction on it.  
Our scenarios draw on features of the proposed pieces of legislation described above 
but in no way purport to model them in their entirety.  Our focus is on the efficiency 
and distributional consequences of allowance allocation schemes and our scenarios 
model allowance trading along with their allocation over time.  In that regard, we have 
had to interpret how we believe various allocations would work in practice when the 
exact allocation approach has not yet been fully described, and would only be 
completely determined by executive branch agencies responsible for these programs if 
the legislation were implemented. In addition, we do not model other components of the 
various pieces of legislation dealing with other policy measures such as renewable 
portfolio standards. 
6. ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS 
Figure 4 shows the Reference and Policy with offsets emissions for the period 2012 
to 2050. Projected Reference cumulative emissions over the 2012-2050 period are 298 
bmt. In the Policy with offsets case, cumulative emissions are 203 bmt, a reduction of 
nearly one-third from Reference. The emissions path shown in Figure 4 for the Policy 
with offsets case is the result from the scenario TAAS.  Cumulative emissions are 
identical under all six policy simulations, and the actual emissions paths are nearly 
identical.  Slight differences in the emissions paths exist because of different overall 
welfare costs and distributional effects that can lead to a slightly different allocation of 
abatement over time, but these differences are so small that they would be imperceptible 
if plotted in Figure 4. Emissions in the Reference include estimates of the effects of 
existing energy policies under the Energy Independence and Security Act and the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as they are projected to affect greenhouse 
gas emissions. Note, that while the allowance allocation for 2050 is set at 83% below 
2005, our projected emissions in 2050 in the Policy with offsets case are only 35% 
below 2005 emissions because of the availability of offsets and banking. Before turning  
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Figure 4.  U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Carbon Price (Scenario TAAS):                     
(a) Greenhouse Gas Emissions, (b) CO2e Price. 
 
to distributional analyses by income group or region, we consider the aggregate U.S. 
welfare impacts of the various policies we model.  Figure 5 presents the change in 
welfare relative to the Reference scenario, measured in equivalent variation as a 
percentage of full income
20
, for the various bills.  One key result we see is that the 
_TAX scenarios lead to higher welfare costs than the scenarios where a fraction of the 
allowance revenue is withheld to satisfy revenue neutrality.  Considering the TAAS 
scenario, for example, the welfare cost is 1.38 percent of full income by 2050 under the 
lump-sum scenario and 1.60 percent under the tax scenario. Similar results hold for 
TAAS_DR and PCDS.  This occurs because the _TAX scenarios create more deadweight 
loss from capital and labor taxation.  Many economists have focused on a double-
dividend effect where allowance revenue is used to lower capital and labor taxes, but 
here we have the reverse effect.  Not enough of the revenue is retained to offset the 
deficit effects of the bill so that capital and labor taxes need to be increased, thereby 
increasing the cost the bill.
21
 
Conditional on the treatment of revenue shortfalls, the three scenarios have very 
similar aggregate costs.  TAAS_DR_TAX is somewhat less costly than TAAS_TAX 
because the former scenario reserves more of the allowance to offset the deficit and thus 
capital and labor taxes do not need to be increased as much. The costs of PCDS and 
PCDS_TAX are slightly lower than the TAAS scenarios. The lower costs of the PCDS 
scenarios at first blush are surprising. These scenarios retain less of the allowance value  
                                                 
20
 Full income is the value of consumption, leisure, and the consumption stream from residential capital. 
21
 This follows from our particular assumption about how taxes are raised to maintain revenue neutrality. 
It is certainly possible that lump-sum taxes could be employed or some other configuration of tax 
increases that is less distortionary than the tax increases we model.  Therefore one should not 
conclude that our result is general. 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 5.  Welfare Change for Different GHG Control Proposals (U.S. Average). 
 
to offset the deficit, and hence in the _TAX case it requires somewhat higher increases 
in capital and labor taxes to offset the deficit. The lower costs in PCDS scenarios arise 
from the distributional outcomes as they affect energy expenditures and savings. In 
particular, TAAS and TAAS_DR, through the low income energy assistance programs 
allocate more of the revenue value to poorer households. Lower income households 
spend a larger fraction of their income on energy and they save less.  Thus, the 
abatement effect of pricing carbon is offset to greater extent by an income effect among 
poorer households in the TAAS and TAAS_DR than in the PCDS scenarios. In addition, 
there is less saving and therefore less investment in TAAS and TAAS_DR because less is 
saved for each additional dollar allocated to poorer households.  Note that our aggregate 
welfare estimates are a simple sum of the welfare of each income class across all 
regions.  An aggregate welfare function that weighted the welfare of lower income 
households higher, giving welfare benefit to more progressive outcomes would change 
these results, showing better results for TAAS and TAAS_DR.  How much to value more 
progressive outcomes is a judgment.  Here we leave it to the policy community to 
decide whether the more progressive outcome of TAAS and TAAS_DR is worth the extra 
welfare cost. 
6.1 Distributional Impacts across Income Groups 
Aggregate impacts obscure differential effects across households.  Ideally we would 
construct a measure of the lifetime burden of carbon pricing and relate that to a measure 
of lifetime income.  Our data do not allow us to do that.  Our recursive-dynamic model  
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Table 6.  Annual Cost per Household by Income Group (Scenario TAAS). 
 hhl hh10 hh15 hh25 hh30 hh50 hh75 hh100 hh150 Average 
2015 -614 -472 -467 -426 36 261 328 344 401 87 
2020 -563 -412 -418 -349 230 386 532 501 532 221 
2025 -450 -248 -207 -64 631 920 1109 1098 1237 646 
2030 -603 -240 -168 63 950 1420 1589 1650 2031 939 
2035 -763 -304 -190 110 1170 1842 2050 2192 2758 1195 
2040 -851 -307 -156 203 1397 2222 2456 2636 3304 1451 
2045 -827 -216 -13 411 1658 2661 2916 3141 3918 1774 
2050 -778 -109 129 594 1853 2974 3246 3482 4278 2008 
NPV  
Average
a -291 -150 -119 -33 331 538 614 642 780 347 
Note: Table reports annual dollar costs per household by income group in various years.  All dollar 
amounts are in 2006 dollars. 
a 
Net Present Value (NPV) average of welfare costs discounted to 2010 at 
4% per annum.  
 
has households of different income groups in each year but we have no data that allow 
us to track the transition of households from one income group to another.  Instead we 
report burden impacts for different income groups at different points of time to show 
how the relative burden shifts over time.   
Figure 6 shows the burden for a representative household in each income group for 
2015, 2030, and 2050 for TAAS measured as equivalent variation divided by full income 
(including the value of leisure and household capital).  Positive values indicate that a 
household benefits from the carbon policy.  Households in the two lowest income 
groups, hhl and hh10, benefit in all periods as the return of permit revenue through 
various mechanisms more than offsets the higher cost of goods and services due to 
carbon pricing and any effects on their wages and capital income. Households hh15 and 
hh25 initially benefit but eventually bear net costs, hh15 only in the final period.  The 
effect of allocating an increasing amount of allowances on a per-capita basis is 
particularly strong for the lowest income group relative to higher income households 
since a dollar of additional revenue makes up a larger fraction of full income for these 
households.
22
  The five highest income households bear net costs throughout the period 
though the burden through 2030 is less than 1 percent of income for all income groups.   
                                                 
22
 Pechman (1985) realized that income data for the low income groups suffered from substantial income 
mismeasurement. Since then, the approach adopted by him and many others is to omit the lowest 
income group from distributional analyses. Given the interest of the policy community for impacts on 
low income households, we decided to report results for households with annual income less than 
$10k, but we want to point out that in light of likely measurements problems we do not have the same 
degree of confidence in results as we do for other income groups. 
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Figure 6.  Welfare Change by Income Group, U.S. Average (Scenario TAAS). 
   
 
 
Figure 7.  Welfare Change by Income Group, U.S. Average (Scenario PCDS). 
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Figure 8.  Welfare Change by Income Group, U.S. Average (Scenario TAAS_TAX). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Welfare Change by Income Group, U.S. Average (Scenario PCDS_TAX). 
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Table 7.  Allocation Of Annual Allowance Value And Tax Revenue (Scenario TAAS). 
Allowance Values and Tax Revenue Allocation of Allowance Value  
(Net of Tax Revenue Loss) 
Year Allowance 
value 
Loss in 
tax 
revenue
a 
Loss in tax 
revenue (% 
of 
allowance 
value) 
Households Government Transferred 
abroad 
2015 160.6 50.3 31.3 99.8 2.9 7.6 
2020 182.9 52.2 28.5 113.0 2.9 9.0 
2025 212.7 72.3 34.0 115.9 5.9 12.4 
2030 254.1 73.1 28.8 131.5 30.2 19.3 
2035 309.5 91.0 29.4 157.3 40.0 21.2 
2040 374.0 124.4 33.3 182.4 43.0 24.2 
2045 434.4 182.8 42.1 195.4 31.8 24.4 
2050 494.7 248.8 50.3 203.0 19.1 23.9 
Note: Unless otherwise stated, all amounts are in billions of dollars. 
a
 Change relative to the baseline. 
 
Over time, the burden of the policy grows for wealthier households with the burden 
ranging from 1 to roughly 1.5 percent by 2050. 
In all years the cap and trade policy combined with the TAAS allocation scenarios is 
sharply progressive over the first five income groups though the burden for each income 
group, except that of the lowest, grows over time as the policy begins to impose larger 
reductions in emissions.  The difference in burdens over the lowest five income groups 
grows over time as does the spread between the burden for the lowest income group 
relative to the highest income group. The policy is essentially neutral over the top 
income groups in all periods.  As we will show below over time sources side effects 
become more important in shaping the distributional outcomes than do uses side effects. 
Table 6 reports the annual cost in dollar terms for different households in different 
years.  On average the per-household costs are relatively modest in the early years of 
the program.  While the costs appear large by 2050, it is important to keep in mind that 
incomes are growing so that these costs are still modest relative to household income. 
The average over time is the net present value (NPV) average.  Note that Waxman-
Markey allows considerable borrowing of allowances from the future by the Federal 
government if necessary to moderate CO2 prices in the early years. If these were 
auctioned in earlier years then the allowance revenue would accrue to the government 
earlier and in principle it could be used earlier.  We have assumed the revenue is only 
available when the allowances were originally scheduled to be auctioned.  If borrowing 
occurred and the revenue was used as specified in the bill—to reduce deficit impacts 
and as a lump sum rebate to consumers - that could blunt some of the progressivity in 
earlier years. 
Costs and distributional impacts for TAAS_DR are very similar to TAAS and so we 
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Table 8.  Increase In Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate for Revenue Neutrality. 
Year TAAS_TAX TAAS_DR_TAX PCDS_TAX 
2015 0.52 0.34 0.48 
2020 0.56 0.35 0.43 
2025 0.73 0.50 0.58 
2030 0.58 0.26 0.55 
2035 0.63 0.31 0.65 
2040 0.80 0.35 0.83 
2045 1.13 0.58 1.12 
2050 1.50 0.79 1.48 
Note: Tax rate increase in percentage points. 
 
do not report them here.  Rather we turn to the PCDS. Like TAAS and TAAS_DR, PCDS 
has modest to negative burdens initially with burdens rising over time.   In comparison 
to the former bills the burden spreads across income groups in any given year are 
smaller. Lower income households benefit in the early years but not as much as in TAAS 
and TAAS_DR. This is reflected in the flatter distributional curves for different years in 
Figure 7.  By 2050 the PCDS scenario and the TAAS scenario have more similar 
distributional effects because by that time the allocation formula in TAAS_DR has 
become similar to that of the PCDS, with 65 percent of revenue distributed on per capita 
basis.  The remaining difference is the continued allocation to low income consumers. 
Distributional outcomes are altered when the full value of allowances is allocated as 
specified in the bills and revenue losses in the federal budget are instead made up by 
raising personal income tax rates.  In general, the distributional burden across household 
groups is more progressive in the _TAX cases.  Consider the burden snapshots for three 
different years as shown in Figure 8 for TAAS_TAX.   Lower-income households fare 
better under this approach with benefits to the lowest income group rising from 1 to 
about 1.5 percent of full income in 2015 while the highest income groups are only 
slightly affected.  Lower income groups continue to do better – and in some cases are 
better off – when tax rates are raised to recoup lost tax revenues than when allowance 
value is withheld.  In general they remain better off through 2050 because of the tax 
changes.  By raising taxes to offset the deficit, more revenue remains available to be 
distributed, and the increase in transfers to lower-income groups more than offsets 
increases in taxation to these households. A similar result holds for the PCDS allocation 
proposal (see Figure 9). 
The different treatments of revenue neutrality illustrates a classic equity-efficiency 
trade-off, where the withholding of allowances to preserve revenue neutrality yields 
higher efficiency but less progressive outcomes than if taxes are raised to maintain 
revenue neutrality in the government budget.   
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  GHG Emissions Reductions by Region (Scenario TAAS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Welfare Change by Region (Scenario TAAS). 
 
The impact of climate policy on government tax revenues is significant and helps 
explain why the different approaches to maintaining revenue neutrality matter.  Table 7 
provides a comparison of allowance values and losses in tax revenue arising from cap-
and-trade policy.  The initial loss of tax revenue due to higher costs for firms and 
reduced economic activity is about 30 percent of the value of allowances.  The 
percentage begins rising in 2040 and by 2050, the loss in tax revenue rises to one-half.   
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Figure 12.  Welfare Change by Region (Scenario PCDS). 
 
The high tax revenue loss is in part an artifact of the assumption in the model that fixes 
the path of government spending to match that of the reference (no policy) scenario (we  
refer to this as absolute revenue neutrality).  Lower GDP growth increases the size of 
government relative to GDP and magnifies the loss in tax revenue relative to allowance 
value.  We make this assumption because the government sector in USREP does not 
produce explicit public goods that have any welfare value.  By keeping revenue neutral 
changes in government we do not release or consume more resources that otherwise 
would be available to private sector.   
An alternative approach would be to fix the ratio of government spending to GDP in 
the policy scenarios.  To assess the distributional implications of this would then require 
production of a public good and an estimate of how that public good created welfare for 
different income classes in different regions, so that when government spending was 
increased or decreased we would have an estimate of how that was affecting 
distribution compared with how distribution was affected by changes in resources 
available to the private sector.  If the government were kept at the same size in relative 
rather than absolute terms, the revenue needed to offset impacts on the deficit would not 
increase and would generally be at about the percentage we see in 2015.  The difference 
would then be additional allowance value that could be used for distributional or other 
purposes.   
We note that the Congressional Budget Office scores bills on their impact on the 
deficit, using a standard procedure for all legislation that is accepted by Congress.  The 
CBO methodology is described in Congressional Budget Office (2009).  That approach 
will not be consistent with our approach that endogenously calculates the deficit, and 
the revenue needed to close the deficit.  The two approaches do lead to reasonably close 
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estimates of the allowance value that must be set aside in early years (25 percent for 
CBO and 30 percent in this analysis) before the results diverge due to the different 
modeling approach taken by CBO from the approach taken here. 
With absolute revenue neutrality, the need to make up substantial revenue losses 
leads to fairly large increases in marginal personal income tax rates under the tax-based 
make-up (see Table 8).  The TAAS_DR_TAX increases are much less than the other two 
scenarios because more of the revenue is explicitly allocated to deficit effects of the 
proposal. This just illustrates one way to make up revenue losses.  Other approaches 
could be undertaken that could enhance efficiency or equity goals.
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Summing up, we find that the TAAS and TAAS_DR scenarios on the one hand and 
the PCDS scenarios on the other have quite different distributional impacts across 
households, especially in the early years of the program.  In addition, policy decisions 
on how to close the budget deficit arising from decreased tax collections have both 
efficiency and distributional implications.   
Using higher personal income taxes to close the deficit incurs an efficiency cost but 
increases the progressivity of the programs because more of the allowance revenue is 
available for distribution to households.  We next turn to regional impacts. 
6.2 Distributional Impacts across Regions 
Policy makers have also expressed concern over the regional impacts of climate 
policy. In this section we explore how regional impacts change over time for the 
allocation scenarios we have designed. Figure 10 shows that the greenhouse gas 
emission reductions differ substantially among regions.  Results are shown for the TAAS 
scenario.  These differences reflect different shares of emissions from different sectors 
(electricity, transportation, industry) and different electric generation technologies 
(nuclear, hydro, coal, natural gas).  The energy and emissions intensive regions 
(MOUNT, SEAST, SCENT, NCENT) show the largest reductions. States in the 
Mountain, Southeast, Northeast and North Central regions all experience reductions in 
GHG emissions relative to the business as usual scenario in excess of 50 percent by 
2050. 
Figure 11 shows the welfare impact of the TAAS scenario for each region. Initially 
California, Texas, Florida and states in the South Central, Pacific, and New England 
regions gain from the policy while other states suffer losses.  By 2050 all states are 
bearing costs, ranging from about one-half of one percent (New England) to about one 
and three-quarters percent. 
Welfare impacts for Alaska are not shown in Figure 11 to better visualize relative 
welfare impacts for other regions.  Under the TAAS scenario Alaska’s welfare effects 
are as follows: 2015: -0.42%; 2020: -1.15%; 2025: -2.26%; 2030: -2.57%; 2040: -
                                                 
23
 This is simply a variant on the green tax swap idea analyzed by Metcalf (1999) and others. 
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3.52%; 2050: -5.27%. The substantial welfare impacts for Alaska can be attributed to 
the fact that Alaska exhibits by far the highest energy intensity among all regions and is 
a large energy producing state with a small population (see Figure 14). In earlier years 
of the policy, welfare effects are relatively modest compared to, e.g., 2030 and 2050. 
Alaska actually receives by far the highest allowance revenue per household among all 
regions under the TAAS scheme since many of the allowances are allocated on the basis 
of either energy consumption or production, but this is far from sufficient to offset the 
large costs the economy bears. As we note below, over time the allowance allocation 
effect becomes less important in determining overall policy costs, and relative regional 
welfare differences are increasingly shaped by energy characteristics and income 
sources. This explains why welfare effects for Alaska become more negative over time 
both relative to earlier periods of the policy and in comparison to other regions.  The 
Alaska case is an interesting one in that it is a small state in terms of population and 
GDP with relatively unique energy use and production attributes.  Our other regions, by 
aggregating more states, tend to average out so that there is less disparity.  The Alaska 
results are illustrative of within region effects that we do not capture because of our 
aggregation. 
Regional impacts under PCDS are less balanced initially (Figure 12). The standard 
deviation of welfare impacts under PCDS is slightly larger (0.11) than under the TAAS 
scenario (0.09). Recall that PCDS deliberately takes a per-capita approach premised on 
the view that regional disparities do not matter, while TAAS includes a number of 
provisions (such as LDC allocations) that are explicitly intended to address regional 
disparities. While the regional dispersion of welfare impacts is slightly larger under 
PCDS, one interesting result of this analysis is that the much simpler per-capita based 
approach is almost as effective in achieving a balanced regional outcome as the targeted 
allocation scheme.  By 2050, the impacts under PCDS are quite similar to those under 
TAAS.  Differential regional impacts due to differences in allowance allocation schemes 
dissipate over time. Section 7.1 provides a discussion of this effect.    
Impacts under TAAS_DR are very similar to those under TAAS and are not reported 
here. Figure 12 also shows that the relative impacts across regions are fairly stable over 
the policy period under the PCDS allocation. South Central, North Central and 
Northeast states bear a larger impact of the policy though the maximum difference 
across the period is less than two percentage points.
24
 
We do not show here the _TAX scenarios because the results are broadly similar to 
the scenarios where a fraction of the allowance value is withheld to satisfy revenue 
neutrality.  The main differences are that the overall welfare costs are larger for the U.S. 
                                                 
24
 Welfare impacts for Alaska under the PCDS scenario are as follows: 2015: -0.60%; 2020: -1.10%; 
2025: -2.31%; 2030: -3.25%; 2040: -4.61%; 2050: -5.95%. Note that under the PCDS allocation 
scheme Alaska receives less allowance revenue as compared to the TAAS case. This lowers savings 
and investment, and hence brings about even larger welfare losses in later periods of the policy as for 
the TAAS scenario. 
32 
 
as a whole and thus regional losses tend to be somewhat larger.  In terms of distribution, 
the _TAX cases tend to favor lower income regions (South and middle of the country) at 
the expense of higher income regions (mainly the East and West coasts) because higher 
income regions pay more taxes.   
Summing up the regional results, all allocation scenarios lead to modest differential 
impacts across most regions.  The TAAS and TAAS_DR proposals show greater gains to 
several regions in the initial years of the policy and higher costs to other regions than do 
the PCDS scenarios.  One of the political economy realities of climate change is that the 
East and West Coast regions have pushed harder for climate legislation while the 
middle of the country and much of south has resisted such legislation.  With high 
energy intensity in these regions and the significant presence of fossil industry one 
might expect greater economic impacts of GHG mitigation legislation in these regions.  
The Cantwell-Collins bill has not been subject to as much debate and negotiation as the 
other two bills, and has been able to retain a simple allocation formula.  The much 
richer set of allocation mechanisms in Markey-Waxman and Kerry-Boxer are likely the 
result of negotiation among representatives of these regions.  To the extent our analysis 
captures the regional distributional intent of these bills it suggests that the allocation 
formula are not completely effective in evening out regional effects.  Some states like 
Texas and those in the South Central region that might have been expected to suffer 
higher costs have those costs blunted significantly and actually come out ahead in early 
years.  Other regions such as the Mountain and North Central states remain the biggest 
losers in early years.  Over time the allocation mechanisms evolve, and regional impacts 
are driven more directly by other factors. 
7. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE BURDEN RESULTS 
In a CGE model it is difficult to attribute differences in results by region and income 
class to specific causes because the possible sources of differences are many and they 
interact in complex ways.  This section provides an analysis of the results to provide 
greater insight into why we see differences in effects.   
7.1 The Importance of the Allowance Allocation Effect over Time 
In order to isolate the impact of the allowance allocation on welfare, we run a 
scenario assuming the allowance value in a given period is not recycled while 
allowances in preceding periods are allocated according to the scheme described in the 
TAAS scenario.   
Note that welfare costs will be higher in this case because the unrecycled revenue 
increases government expenditure which as described earlier does not, as modeled, 
enter household utility functions.  The intent here is to use this exercise to isolate the 
effects of higher energy costs caused by pricing from those distributional impacts that  
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Figure 13.  Regional Welfare Impacts without Allowance Allocation (Scenario TAAS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Regional Energy Intensity over Time (Scenario TAAS). 
 
result from the allowance allocation. Figure 13 shows regional welfare impacts under 
this ―no-recycling‖ case. As expected, welfare costs for each region and each period are  
higher as compared with the corresponding scenario that assumes revenue allocation 
(compare with Figure 14). For 2015, the distribution of regional costs is due to 
differences in regional abatement costs. In later years, the results are driven by 
abatement costs for that year, and the economic growth effects from previous years 
through the impact on Gross Regional Product and savings and investment. We see 
from Figure 13 that the pattern of regional welfare costs corresponds closely to 
differences in regional energy intensity (energy consumption per dollar of GDP). Figure 
14 shows an index of energy intensity by region over time (normalized to the current 
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period U.S. value). The patterns of regional welfare impacts and relative energy 
intensities largely coincide, and are stable over time.    
Comparing Figure 13 with Figure 11 now provides a way of disentangling the effect 
of the current period allowance allocation on welfare. The key result is that the 
allocation effect becomes less important over time, and that regional welfare impacts 
are eventually driven more by differences in the energy intensity. One reason for this 
result is that over time there is less allowance value to be distributed relative to the 
rising CO2 price as the carbon policy becomes tighter. The number of allowances 
decreases over time and, in addition to that, the erosion of the tax base is steadily 
increasing which means that more of the allowance value has to be retained to maintain 
revenue-neutrality. This effect explains why initially in periods 2015-2025 the 
allocation of allowances has a strong effect on regional welfare impacts of the policy.  
As noted, regional effects of TAAS bear little relationship to factors like energy intensity 
and energy production that should factor into the cost of the policy.  Some of the 
regions that display relative high energy intensity are actually overcompensated in 2015 
and 2020 (viz. the South Central and North Central region, and Texas). The results 
suggest that any implemented allocation scheme will prove to be less effective over 
time in muting the regional variation in welfare impacts.   
7.2 Sources vs. Uses Side Impacts of Carbon Pricing  
A well-established observation is that carbon pricing incorporates a regressive 
element because lower income households spend a higher proportion of their income on 
energy.  Most estimates of the distributional impact of carbon and energy pricing focus 
on this ―cost-push analysis‖ element of carbon pricing by using an Input-Output 
framework to trace price increases through a make-and-use matrix to evaluate the policy 
cost on different households based on expenditure shares (e.g., Dinan and Rogers 
(2002), Parry (2004), Burtraw et al. (2009) and Hassett et al. (2009)). Such an approach 
neglects behavioral responses to relative price changes and does not take into account 
sources side effects.
25
 Rausch et al. (2009) found that even in a static model the sources 
side effects were important in determining the distributional effects of carbon pricing. 
Here we repeat their counterfactual analysis in our recursive dynamic simulation. 
Figure 15 provides welfare impacts across income groups for three scenarios 
designed to disentangle the contribution of sources and uses side effects on welfare 
across the income distribution. The logic of our counterfactual analysis is as follows. If 
households in different income groups are characterized by identical income shares i.e.,  
 
 
                                                 
25
 Sources side effects refer to burden impacts arising from changes in relative factor prices, while uses 
side effects refer to burden impacts arising from change in relative product prices. This terminology 
goes back to Musgrave (1957). 
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Figure 15. Relative Sources vs. Uses Side Impacts across Income Distribution: (a) Year 2015, 
(b) Year 2030, (c) Year 2050. 
 
have equal ratios of capital, labor, and transfer income, then a change in relative factor 
prices affects all households equally. This counterfactual analysis isolates the 
distributional impacts of the uses of income effects of a policy.  If households are 
assumed to have identical expenditure shares for all goods and services, a change in 
relative product prices produces an equal impact on consumers in different income 
classes.  In that case, we isolate the distributional impacts of the sources of income 
effects of a policy.  Any differential burden impacts of a policy across households from 
the counterfactual case that eliminates differences among households in how they spend 
their income are then determined by sources of income effects.  Results that eliminate 
differences in income sources, allows us to focus on how uses side factors shape the 
relative burden of carbon pricing. 
The two counterfactual cases do not eliminate these drivers of incidence but by 
eliminating household heterogeneity they suppress differential impacts across the 
income distribution.  Harberger (1962) uses a similar analysis to identify the incidence 
of a corporate income tax. Note that as we measure the real burden, i.e., the change in  
 
36 
 
Table 8.  Source of Income by Annual Income Class in USREP Model. 
 Fraction of  
Income from  
Labor 
Fraction of  
Income from  
Capital 
Fraction of  
Income from  
Transfers 
K/L ratio Transfer /  
(Capital+Labor) ratio 
Hhl 12.8% 6.5% 80.8% 0.5 4.2 
hh10 28.6% 9.8% 61.6% 0.3 1.6 
hh15 43.0% 18.2% 38.8% 0.4 0.6 
hh25 48.3% 22.3% 29.5% 0.5 0.4 
hh30 55.3% 24.7% 20.0% 0.4 0.3 
hh50 60.4% 35.4% 4.2% 0.6 0.0 
hh75 62.0% 37.5% 0.5% 0.6 0.0 
hh100 59.4% 42.3% -1.7% 0.7 0.0 
hh150 57.6% 45.7% -3.3% 0.8 0.0 
Note: Based on IMPLAN data (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2008). Household transfers include social 
security, state welfare payments, unemployment compensation, veterans’ benefits, food stamps, 
supplemental security income, direct relief, earned income credit. Note that transfers are net of household 
transfer payments to the rest-of-world (including cash transfers as well as goods to the rest-of-world). 
 
equivalent variation, our incidence calculation is independent from the choice of 
numéraire.  
 Figure 15a shows results for 2015, Figure 15b for 2030 and Figure 15c for 2050. In 
each panel results for three cases are shown.  The line labeled ―carbon pricing burden‖ 
shows the welfare effect that combines income and expenditure heterogeneity.  This is  
the welfare effect, without any recycling, given observed income sources and 
expenditures shares as they vary among households.  The line labeled ―identical income 
shares‖ eliminates heterogeneity of income sources to isolate the uses side effect of the 
policy.  The line labeled ―identical expenditure shares‖ eliminates expenditure 
heterogeneity to isolate the sources side effect.  A downward slope indicates a 
progressive result and an upward slope a regressive result. We also show the observed 
burden policy impacts labeled as ―carbon pricing burden.‖ This shows the differential 
burden impacts resulting from heterogeneity in both the sources and uses of income. 
To eliminate the muddying effect of allowance allocation we assume that the carbon 
revenue is not recycled to households.
26
 Non-recycled revenue increases government 
spending on goods and services which, by assumption, is not utility enhancing. As a 
result, the costs to households are much larger because the allowance revenue is not 
available to them but we still see the striking result that carbon pricing is modestly 
progressive initially and, for income groups above the two lowest becomes essentially 
neutral by 2030. For the counterfactual analysis we hold government transfers to 
households constant at the no policy level.   
The uses side impacts are sharply regressive in all years in accord with previous 
analyses that focus on expenditure side burdens only.  Sources side impacts, on the 
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 We also looked at a scenario in which we assume that additional government revenue is spent 
according to private sector consumption. We find that this has second-order effects only. 
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other hand, are modestly progressive in 2015 and essentially proportional in the other 
years. In all years, combined effects in the line ―carbon pricing burden‖ track closely 
the line ―identical expenditure shares.‖ This suggests that relative welfare impacts 
across the income distribution are largely driven by sources side effects. 
Table 8 reports sources of income by income class for the base year, and helps to 
explain why sources side effects are modestly progressive especially at low income 
levels. The relative income burden of carbon pricing depends on the change in relative 
factors prices and on differences in the ratio for the sources of income for households. 
We find that the capital rental rate increases over time relative to the price for labor. As 
the capital-labor ratio slightly increases in income, just looking at the relative income 
burden from changes in capital and labor income would imply that the uses side is 
slightly regressive. This finding is in line with Fullerton and Heutel (2010) who find 
that the capital and labor income for the lowest income households falls proportionally 
more than average. What makes the source-side incidence modestly progressive to 
proportional is the fact that low income households derive a large fraction of income 
from transfers relative to low income households, and we hold transfers constant 
relative to the no policy baseline. Transfer income thus insulates households from 
changes in capital and labor income. This effect is strongest for the two lowest income 
households where transfers account for about 80 and 60 percent of income as shown in 
Table 8.
27
   
Figure 15 also suggests that especially in a dynamic setting, the sources side effect is 
more important in determining the welfare impact than is the uses side effect for a given 
income class. The intuition for this result seems fairly obvious—over time the impacts 
of an ongoing mitigation policy cumulate through effects on overall economic growth 
and are reflected in general wage rates and capital returns. The annual abatement costs 
become an ever smaller share of the economic burden of the policy, and so are less 
important in determining the overall impacts. Furthermore, because the fraction of 
income derived from transfers increases over time, we find that the progressivity of the 
sources-side effect also slightly increases for the five lowest income groups.      
Overall, this analysis demonstrates that it can be misleading to base the distributional 
analysis on uses side factors only. The virtue of our general equilibrium framework is 
the ability to capture both expenditure and income effects in a comprehensive manner.  
8. SUMMARY 
There has been much attention on the overall cost and efficiency of current 
legislative proposals for addressing climate change in the U.S.   In this paper we focus 
on the distributional effects of the policies taking account of both the higher energy 
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 The sensitivity of distributional impacts of policies to the treatment of government transfers has been 
found in other work.  Browning and Johnson (1979), for example, find that holding transfers fixed in 
real terms sharply increases the progressivity of the U.S. tax system.  
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costs that carbon pricing implies and the distribution of allowance value described in 
the bills.  Secondarily we are also interested in any efficiency effects of the allowance 
allocation approaches in the different bills.  To focus on the effect of allowance 
allocation, we used approximations of the allowance allocation features of current 
proposals, but represented here as a comparable, comprehensive cap on all emissions in 
the U.S. with the same level of external credits allowed across all allocation scenarios.  
We, therefore, did not represent other features of the bills many of which may have 
strong efficiency and distributional consequences.  While we try to adhere to the text of 
the various pieces of legislation as closely as possible when allocating allowance value, 
we note that we had to rely on our own interpretation of legislative intent in places 
where allocation mechanisms were not completely defined in the bills.  While the 
scenarios are motivated by the various proposed pieces of legislation, none of the 
scenarios should be interpreted as an analysis of the complete legislation.  
Focusing on efficiency first, we find that retaining more of the revenue to offset the 
deficit impacts of the legislation, as does the Kerry Boxer bill, improves the efficiency 
of mitigation policy because labor and capital taxes need to be raised less to maintain 
revenue neutrality.  Economic efficiency is improved if all deficit impacts are offset 
with revenue retained from the allowance auction.  The trade-off is that it would leave 
less revenue to affect desired distributional outcomes.  
We also find that the scenarios designed to approximate the Cantwell-Collins 
allocation proposal to be less costly than those we used to approximate the other bills. 
We trace this result to the fact that the Cantwell-Collins allocation proposal distributes 
less of the allowance value to poor households.  In the other allocation schemes, more 
money for poorer households produces a greater income effect on energy demand, and 
as a result abatement is more costly.  Poorer households also save less, and so more 
allowance value going to poor households leads to less savings and investment.  
Economists have widely acknowledged that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff 
between schemes with lump-sum distribution and those that would cut labor and capital 
taxes, reducing the distortions they create. Here we find a more subtle equity-efficiency 
tradeoff, where even under lump sum distribution of revenue there is an efficiency gain 
to distributing value to wealthier households because less is spent on energy and more 
of the allowance value ends up as savings and investment.   
Our analysis of distribution by income class and region show that the Waxman-
Markey and Kerry-Boxer (or Kerry-Lieberman) allocation schemes address the 
distributional impacts of the policy by redistributing more of the allowance value to 
poorer households and to central and southern regions of the U.S. in the early years of 
the policy, shifting allowance value away from wealthier households and the coasts.  In 
fact the bills redistribute to such a degree that they tend to result in net economic 
benefits for the poorest households and for some regions of the country such as the 
South Central states, Texas, and Florida that would generally be expected to bear the 
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highest costs.  The very simple per capita allocation scheme of Cantwell-Collins tends 
to be more distributionally neutral by income class but produces slightly less balanced 
outcome by region.  Over time the distribution schemes matter less.  In part this is 
because over time all these bills convert to a consumer rebate and so are more like the 
Cantwell-Collins allocation approach.  However, over time more of the annual cost of 
the policy is the result of economic growth effects—reductions in past Gross Regional 
Product, savings, and investment.  The annual abatement costs become a smaller share 
of the total costs, and the available revenue to alter distributional effects shrinks relative 
to this increasing cost.
28
   
An important finding of this paper is that sources side effects of carbon mitigation 
proposals dominate the uses side effect in terms of determining distribution outcomes. 
In the near term, the distributional consequences of the carbon pricing can be 
significantly affected by the distribution of allowance value. Over the longer term, 
however, the overall growth effects are more important determinants of distribution and 
the revenue available from the allowance auction may not be sufficient to have much 
effect in changing distributional outcomes.  This point is reinforced by the finding that 
carbon pricing by itself, i.e., when carbon revenues are not recycled back to households, 
is neutral to modestly progressive. This follows from the dominance of sources over 
uses side impacts of the policy and stands in sharp contrast to previous work that has 
focused only on the uses side. We find sources side effects to be modestly progressive 
to proportional because low income households derive a relatively large fraction of their 
income from transfers which insulates them from changes in capital and labor income.  
We emphasize that our scenarios focused solely on the distributional implications 
due to carbon pricing and the allocation of allowance revenue, and that we did not 
attempt to model each bill in its entirety. More precise representation of the many 
programs described in these bills could give different outcomes and there is inevitable 
uncertainty in economic forecasts of this type. We also must admit significant 
limitations in our ability to forecast relative effects on regions over the longer term. 
Climate policy will dramatically change energy technologies and regions that 
aggressively develop these industries and attract investment could fare better even if 
they currently are heavily fossil energy dependent. However, such regions must 
overcome the initially higher costs of their fossil energy dependence. 
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